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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to two different plea agreements covering four different cases,
Curtis Hartshorn pled guilty to one count each of: delivery of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine), escape, issuing a check without sufficient funds, and grand theft.
When all was said and done, Mr. Hartshorn was left with an aggregate prison sentence
of at least four, but no more than twelve, years. After being sentenced, Mr. Hartshorn
filed a motion for a sentence reduction, pursuant to Idaho criminal Rule 35 (hereinaffer
Rule 35 motion), as to each of the four offenses, as well as a motion to withdraw his
plea of guilty to the grand theft charge. Those motions were all denied.
On appeal, Mr. Hartshorn contends that the district court denied him his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel by holding a hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty
plea where defense counsel was not present. He further contends that the district court
abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 motions.
In response, the State claims that Mr. Hartshorn did not have a Sixth Amendment
right to counsel in pursuing his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because such
proceedings constitute a "collateral attack" on his conviction, not a "critical stage" of his
criminal case. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-13.) The State further argues that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Hartshorn's Rule 35 motions.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.14-20.)
The present Reply Brief is necessary to respond to the State's first argument-its
claim that withdrawal of plea proceedings do not constitute a "critical stage" of the

defendant's case. Because the State's second argument is unremarkable, no response
is necessary.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedincis
Although the factual and procedural histories of this case were previously set
forth in Mr. Hartshorn's opening brief (see Appellant's Brief, pp.1-10) and, therefore,
need not be repeated herein, one factual clarification is necessary in light of a claim
made in the State's Respondent's Brief.
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hartshorn discussed the fact that he was
unrepresented at the February 12, 2008 hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea
even though his appointed counsel, the Bonneville County Public Defender's Office,
had, a year earlier, been ordered by the district court to continue to represent
Mr. Hartshorn "for all purposes other than appeal."

(Appellant's Brief, p.13, n.13.)

Mr. Hartshorn also noted that the Record on Appeal was silent as to why
Mr. Hartshorn's attorneys were absent from the February 12, 2008 hearing.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 13, n.14.)
In its Respondent's Brief, the State speculates, based on a one-line entry in the
district court's Register of Actions, that Mr. Hartshorn's counsel failed to appear at the
February 12, 2008 hearing because counsel had previously withdrawn. (Respondent's
Brief, p.13, n.4.) In support of this guess, the State points out that the Register of
Actions contains and entry, dated April 6, 2007, stating "Notice of Withdrawal."
(Respondent's Brief, p.13, n.4.)
It is important to point out that the State's speculation is, at this point, just thatrank speculation. Since the State has not augmented the record with a copy of the

"Notice of Withdrawal," one can only guess that that filing was an attempt on the part of
counsel to withdraw.
More importantly though, it should be noted that mere "notice" was likely
inadequate to effectuate the withdrawal of counsel. See I.C.R. 44.1. This would seem
to be especially true where, as here, the district court had already ordered counsel to
continue representing the defendant. (Grand Theft Case R., p.61.)

ISSUES

1.

Did the district court deny Mr. Hartshorn his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by
holding a hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea where defense
counsel was not present?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Hartshorn's Rule 35
motion?

ARGUMENT

The District Court Denied Mr. Hartshorn His Sixth Amendment Riaht To Counsel By
Holdincl A Hearina On The Motion To Withdraw His Guiltv Plea Where Defense Counsel
Was Not Present
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hartshorn argued that the district court denied him his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel by holding a hearing on the motion to withdraw his
guilty plea where defense counsel was not present. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-14.) In
support of that argument, he identified a host of federal and state cases holding that
proceedings on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea constitute a "critical stage" of the
criminal case; he observed that there is a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at any such
critical stage; and he argued that, since neither his appointed counsel, nor any other
attorney, was present during the hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the
district court was precluded from proceeding with that hearing. (Appellant's Brief,
pp.12-14.) In terms of the relief requested, Mr. Hartshorn asked that the district court
order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea be vacated, and that his case be
remanded for a new hearing on that motion. (Appellant's Brief, p.16.)
In response, the State claims that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a
collateral attack on the defendant's conviction, not a critical stage of the case where the
defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-13.)
Critical to this argument is a temporal distinction between pre-sentencing and postsentencing motions to withdraw guilty pleas. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7, 8-9, 9-10,
I1 . Specifically, the State argues that the cases cited in Mr. Hartshorn's opening brief
(for the proposition that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a critical stage of a criminal
case) are distinguishable from this case on the basis that some of those cases dealt

with pre-sentencing attempts by defendants to withdraw their guilty pleas, whereas
Mr. Hartshorn's motion to withdraw his piea was filed post-sentencing. (Respondent's
Brief, pp.6-11.) However, for the reasons set forth below, the State's arguments are
without merit.
Notably, it appears that the temporal distinction between pre-sentencing and
post-sentencing motions to withdraw guilty pleas, which the State now urges this Court
to view as dispositive,' has only been found to have been significant in one caseState v. Winston, 19 P.3d 495 (Wash. Ct. App., Div. 1 2001). That case, however, was
very poorly reasoned.

In Winsfon, the Washington Court of Appeals relied on

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), for the proposition that "[ilt is wellestablished that there is no constitutional right to counsel in post conviction
proceedings, other than the first direct appeal of right," Winston, 19 P.3d at 497, and,

Elsewhere in its brief, the State suggests that ldaho law has already embraced a
substantive distinction between pre-sentencing and post-sentencing motions, holding
that the former are non-critical stages of the defendant's criminal case. (See
Respondent's Brief, pp.12-13.) Specifically, the State contends that because, under
State v. Wade, 125 ldaho, 873 P.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1994), appointment of counsel for a
defendant filing a motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to I.C.R. 35 is governed by
an ldaho statute (I.C. § 19-852), not the Sixth Amendment, the same must hold true for
appointment of counsel for a defendant filing a post-sentencing motion to withdraw his
plea. (Respondent's Brief, pp.12-13.) There are a number of flaws in the State's
argument though. First, a motion to withdraw a piea is a fundamentally different motion
than a motion for a sentence reduction. Second, in the Wade Opinion, there is no
indication that a Sixth Amendment argument was ever presented to the Court of
Appeals. See Wade, 125 ldaho at 523-24, 873 P.2d at 168-69; cf. State v. Wegner,
2009 WL 32484, *3 (Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2009) (not yet final) (holding that an ldaho statute
governs the question of whether counsel should be appointed for a motion to withdraw a
plea, but containing no indication that a Sixth Amendment argument was ever
presented by the defendant). Third, even though section 19-852 was applied in Wade,
the Court of Appeals did note in that case that "[a] criminal defendant has a right to
counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process, including pursuit of a Rule 35
motion." Wade, 125 ldaho at 523, 873 P.2d at 168.

based on this language in Finley, it held that because Mr. Winston's motion to withdraw
his plea was filed after his conviction was entered ("post conviction") Finley mandated
that Mr. Winston had no right to counsel. Winston, 19 P.3d at 499. While such a brightline rule is certainly easy to apply, it represents an overly broad reading of Finley.
In fact, in Finley, when the Supreme Court spoke of "postconviction review," it
was speaking of a true collateral attack on the defendant's conviction-a

civil

proceeding, separate and apart from the defendant's underlying criminal case. Finley,
481 U.S. at 553, 556-57. Thus, in Finley, the Court was not considering application of a
Sixth Amendment right to counsel at all; rather, it was concerned with the question of
whether a petitioner has a Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel in his collateral
attack on his conviction. Id. at 555-59.
Moreover, as the State candidly acknowledges, other courts, i.e, the Florida
courts, have explicitly rejected the idea that a post-sentencing motion to withdraw a plea
is not a critical stage simply because of its timing. (See Respondent's Brief, p.10.) For
example, in Padgeff v. Stafe, 743 So.2d 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999), the Florida Court
of Appeals noted the Finley Court's use of the term "postconviction" and recognized that
"[iln the literal sense," a motion to withdraw a plea filed after sentencing "is
postconviction since it comes only after an adjudication of guilt," but it rejected the
notion that the term "postconviction" has ever "been given this limited meaning," and it
pointed out that "[tlhe term postconviction is generally equated with the concept of
collateral relief, i.e., an attack on the conviction and sentence outside of trial and appeal
process." Id. at 72. Indeed, the Court of Appeals noted that if the Finley Court's use of
the term "postconviction" were to be taken literally, even a sentencing hearing would be

considered a post conviction proceeding wherein the defendant would have no right to
counsel. Id. Thus, the Court in that case held that where the defendant, pursuant to
court rule, brings a timely motion in his criminal case to withdraw his plea, a hearing on
that motion is a critical stage of the criminal case and, therefore, the defendant has a
Sixth Amendment right to counsel at that hearing. Id. at 73.
Consistent with the Padgetf Court's Opinion, the Georgia Supreme Court, in
Fortson V. State, 532 S.E.2d 102 (Ga. 2000), another case cited by State (Respondent's
Brief, p.10), also held that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, filed in the defendant's
criminal case, was a critical stage of the proceeding even though the motion was filed
after sentencing. Id. at 103-05. In that case, the Georgia Supreme Court explicitly
rejected the government's contention that a post-sentencing motion to withdraw a guilty
plea is akin to a true collateral attack on a conviction (which would be a petition for writ
of habeas corpus under Georgia law):
A habeas corpus proceeding is a collateral, civil action which may be
brought after the right to direct appeal is exhausted and the underlying
criminal action, including the critical stage of prosecution, has ended. On
the other hand, a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea involves
intricacies of the law and advocacy by the State against the defendant.
Because these elements differentiate the guilty plea withdrawal
proceeding from the habeas corpus proceeding, we accordingly reject the
State's argument that a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is
analogous to a habeas corpus proceeding such that appointment of
counsel would not be necessary.

Id. at 104-05.
Turning to Idaho law, it ought to be apparent that Mr. Hartshorn's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, filed in his criminal case and pursuant to a rule of criminal
procedure (I.C.R. 33(c)), was not a "collateral atiack on his conviction because it was
not a "postconviction" claim within the meaning of Finley. Obviously, Mr. Hartshorn

could have raised a collateral attack to his conviction by filing a petition for postconviction relief under Idaho's Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA"),
I.C. 33 19-4901 et seq., and the claim presented in such a petition would have certainly
been similar to the motion that was filed in this case, see, e.g., State v. Jakoski, 2002
WL 31855374, *5 (Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2002) (unpublished opinion) (holding that a
defendant may challenge an allegedly invalid plea under I.C.R. 33(c) or the UPCPA,
and noting that after the time lapses for filing Rule 33 motions and direct appeals, the
UPCPA supplies the exclusive mechanism by which a defendant can challenge his
plea"); however, that is clearly not the approach that Mr. Hartshorn took in this case.
More importantly though, in trying to draw an arbitrary distinction between
pre-sentencing and post-sentencing motions to withdraw pleas, the State has lost sight
of the applicable standard for determining whether a particular proceeding constitutes a
critical stage of the defendant's case: whether the "substantial rights of a criminal
accused may be affected" at that stage.'

Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).

Applying this standard to the case at hand, it is clear that any hearing on
Mr. Hartshorn's motion is a critical stage of his criminal case because, regardless of its
timing, such a hearing has a monumental impact on his rights. "It cannot be gainsaid

Insofar as the State implies that if a motion filed pursuant to I.C.R. 33(c) is deemed to
be a critical stage of the defendant's criminal case, he will have a perpetual right to
appointed counsel (see Respondent's brief, pp.10-11 (discussing the fact that both
Florida and Georgia have put time limits on the filing of motions to withdraw guilty
pleas)), such concerns are not part of the applicable analysis. Moreover, such concerns
are unfounded because, although I.C.R. 33 does not contain any explicit time limits, it is
exceptionally clear under ldaho law that a district court's jurisdiction to entertain a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea generally expires at the conclusion of the defendant's
direct appeal or, if no direct appeal has been taken, 42 days after entry of the judgment
of conviction. State v. Jakoski, 139 ldaho 352, 354-55, 79 P.3d 711, 713-14 (2003).

that a defendant's guilty plea is the most critical stage of the proceeding as it forecloses
his very right to a trial. Consequently, in the face of an allegedly involuntary plea, a plea
withdrawal hearing is vital to ensuring the integrity of the process by which guilt may
ultimately be determined." United States v. Davis, 239 F.3d 283, 285-86 (2d Cir. 2001).

Given The New Information Provided To The District Court In Coniunction With
Mr. Hartshorn's Rule 35 Motion. As Well As That Which Had Already Been Presented
To The District Court At The Time Of His Sentencinq Hearinas, It Was An Abuse Of
Discretion Not To Reduce Mr. Hartshorn's Sentences
Because the State's arguments concerning Mr. Hartshorn's claim that the district
court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 motions are unremarkable, no
response is necessary herein. Rather, Mr. Hartshorn refers this Court back to the
arguments made at pages 14-16 of his Appellant's Brief.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, as well as those that were articulate in his
Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hartshorn respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district
court's order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the grand theft charge,
and that it remand his case for a new hearing on that motion. He also requests that this
Court reduce his sentences.
DATED this 21'' day of October, 2009.
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